2075 U TUKRIM:30-03-26 1999:31-03-26 06:39:11.000 TUKRIM:30-03-26 utf8 0 Osn Text txt Computermedien c Online-Ressource cr 1967633398 10.1007/s10940-025-09616-8 KXP 1967633398 eng rda 2026 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10940-025-09616-8 R Volltext LF 34 When Do Guardians Deter Offending? An Experimental Test of Informal Social Control Mechanisms 36345201X Tpv1 gnd/124623913 294418008 piz Engel Christoph 1956 VerfasserIn aut 1879905140 Tpv3 gnd/1318183642 piz Lanfear Charles C. VerfasserIn aut 603780695 Tpv1 gnd/138505543 308775597 piz Nagin Daniel 1948 VerfasserIn aut 42 2026 1 91-112 Enthalten in 320578003 Obv zdb/2017241-2 104082321 1573-7799 Journal of quantitative criminology New York, NY [u.a.] Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 1985 Online-Ressource 202600000420001909 Deterrence Experiment Guardianship Informal social control 2,1 krzom orcid:0000-0001-5712-757X | Charles C. Lanfear | taken from website krzom orcid:0000-0001-8513-8532 | Christoph Engel | taken from website krzom orcid:0000-0003-0075-1851 | Daniel Nagin | taken from website PurposeTo inform community theories of informal social control, we test the circumstances under which private citizens can be effective in deterring would-be offenders and identifying characteristics and motivations of citizens willing to assume this role.MethodsWe conducted 447 trials of an online laboratory experiment with monetary incentives in which participants were randomly assigned to one of three roles: Target, Guardian, or Thief. Thieves could steal from Targets but Guardians could pay to punish Thieves for taking. We observe rates of theft while randomizing the presence of Guardians and their number, the cost of punishment for the Guardian, and the maximum punishment by Guardians. We also measured participant regard for others.ResultsPotential offenders were deterred by punishments provided punishment potentially exceeded the rewards of offending but only when their regard for the welfare of others was low. Potential offenders with high regard for the welfare of others were unlikely to offend regardless of the threat of punishment. The pronounced interaction between deterrence and regard for others is notable because the main effect of regard for others is far larger than the main effect of the threat of punishment. The impact of regard for the welfare of others also extended to guardians. Guardians were willing to punish infractions even if punishing was costly for them and did so more often when their regard for others was higher.ConclusionsThe risk that a community member might intervene on behalf of a victim deters others from offending, however regard for the welfare others had a far larger impact on taking decisions than the capacity of guardians to punish. We discuss implications for community interventions with deterrence components. 2075 PICA 30-03-26 30-03-26 10:58:42.000 TUKRIM:30-03-26 utf8 4945532095 30-03-26 l01 2619 n 00 krzo 12